Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by
a federal court of appeals opinion between September 1, 2006 and
January 31, 2007. This collection is organized by civil and criminal
matters, then by subject matter.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be
exhaustive, but will hopefully serve the reader well as a reference
starting point.
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CIVIL MATTERS
CONSTITUTIONAL/FEDERAL LAW

Copyright Affirmative Defenses – Laches: Chirco v. Crosswinds
Cmtys., Inc., 474 F.3d 227 (6th Cir. 2007)
The 6th Circuit held that laches can be argued as an affirmative
defense in copyright actions. Id. at 229. The court agreed with the 7th
Circuit’s conclusion that “a flat proscription such as that invoked by the
[4th] Circuit against the defense of laches in cases involving a federal
statutory claim is both unnecessary and unwise.” Id. at 233-34. The court
held that “laches can be argued ‘regardless of whether the suit is at law
or in equity, because, as with many equitable defenses, the defense of
laches is equally available in suits at law’”. Id.
Political Question Doctrine – Holocaust Survivor Claims:
Rozenkier v. AG Shering, 196 Fed. App’x 93 (3d Cir. 2006)
The 3rd Circuit addressed the issue of whether the claims of a
Holocaust survivor against German corporations alleged to have
cooperated with the Nazi government “are nonjusticiable under the
political question doctrine. . . .” Id. at 94. The court held that “the
adjudication of Nazi-era claims by United States federal courts would
express a lack of respect for . . . the Executive Branch’s longstanding
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foreign policy interest that issues relating to World War II and Nazi-era
claims be resolved through intergovernmental negotiation.” Id. at 98. In
reaching this holding, the court took note of an Executive Agreement
between the United States and Germany that memorialized a 1998
compromise in which “the federal governments of the United States and
Germany, German corporations, and attorneys for various plaintiffs
agreed that the plaintiffs would voluntarily dismiss their lawsuits in
exchange for the creation of [a] German Foundation . . . which would
make payments to Nazi victims from a DM 10 billion pool.” Id. at 95.
The court observed that its interpretation of the political question
doctrine conflicted with the interpretation of the 11th Circuit, which had
“reasoned that because the Executive Agreement, which is the same as
that at issue here, stated that it did not provide an independent legal basis
for dismissal, the ‘President has purposely chosen not to settle [the]
claims directly’ and therefore adjudication of the claims does not
‘interfere with American foreign relations.’” Id. at 101. The court
disagreed with the 11th Circuit because “that language does not preclude
United States federal courts from dismissing claims arising under the
Executive Agreement as raising a nonjusticiable political question.”
Rozenkier, 196 Fed. Appx. at 101.
Municipal Boards of Education Liability – But For Test:
Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250 (6th Cir.
2006)
The 6th Circuit held that the proper test for determining whether “a
[municipal board of education], rather than its members, acts with
improper motive,” is a “but for” test. Id. at 262. The 6th Circuit noted
that the 1st Circuit held that board liability existed only “where the
plaintiff established both: ‘(a) bad motive on the part of at least a
significant block of legislators, and (b) circumstances suggesting the
probable complicity of others.’” Id. The court found that such a test
would be “difficult to apply, because it leaves many questions
unanswered. Among the most important of these is what constitutes a
‘significant block of legislators’ or ‘circumstances suggesting the
probable complicity of others.’” Id. The court explained that under the
test implied by the 2nd, 3rd, and 9th Circuits, “a board is liable for
actions that it would not have taken ‘but for’ members acting with
improper motive.” Id. The 6th Circuit found this test to be more in line
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle. Id. For those reasons, the 6th Circuit adopted the “but
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for” test to determine whether a municipal board of education, as
opposed to its members, acted with an improper motive. Id. at 263.
Choice of Law – CERCLA: New York v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 460
F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2006)
The 2nd Circuit discussed whether state law or federal common law
governs when considering corporate successor liability for the purposes
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”). Id. at 203. Although the issue was
irrelevant to the ultimate holding and the court had already decided in
B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996), that federal
common law applied in these instances, that decision had subsequently
been overruled. Id. at 207. Accordingly, the court articulated the test for
determining whether to apply federal common law rather than state law
as, “(1) whether the federal program, by its very nature, requires
uniformity; (2) whether application of state law would frustrate specific
objectives of the federal program; and (3) whether application of a
uniform federal rule would disrupt existing commercial relationships
based on state law.” Id. The court noted that the 1st, 6th, 9th, and 11th
Circuits found no conflict with applying state law in these CERCLA
cases. Id. at 207-08. In contrast, the 3rd and 4th Circuits found a national
rule to be in order in CERCLA cases. Id. The court ultimately applied the
Betkoski standard and found, along with the 1st, 6th, 9th, and 11th
Circuits, that there is “no conflict between the application of state law
and the federal interests at issue in CERCLA, and we fail to see one.” Id.
at 208.
Fair Housing Act – Standards for Discrimination: Cmty. House,
Inc. v. City of Boise, 468 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006)
The 9th Circuit noted that it had “not previously adopted a standard
for determining the propriety or acceptability of justifications for facial
discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.” Id. at 1125. Recognizing a
circuit split over the issue, the court first stated that the 8th Circuit uses
“the same standard for analyzing a defendant’s rationales in challenges
under the Fair Housing Act as it applies to claims under the Equal
Protection Clause.” Id. The court then stated that the standard employed
by the 6th and 10th Circuits require defendants to show either “(1) that
the restriction benefits the protected class or (2) that it responds to
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legitimate safety concerns raised by the individuals affected, rather than
being based on stereotypes.” Id. In rejecting the 8th Circuit’s approach,
and adopting the standard used by the 6th and 10th Circuits, the court
reasoned that, “the Eighth Circuit’s approach is inappropriate for Fair
Housing Act claims because some classes of persons specifically
protected by the Fair Housing Act, such as families and the handicapped,
are not protected classes for constitutional purposes.” Id. at 1125-26.
Scope of Law – Court Regulation of Abusive Litigant Behavior:
Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Assoc., 469 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir. 2006)
Appellant appealed the district court’s order prohibiting the
commencement of “any pro se litigation in any court in the United States
on any subject matter unless” appellant is represented by a lawyer or has
received specific court approval. Id. at 1344. Appellant argued that this
order was too broad and was not an exercise of “carefully tailored
restrictions under the appropriate circumstances.” Id. at 1343. On appeal,
appellee cited a 2nd Circuit case supporting their “argument that the
breadth of the district court’s order was appropriate.” Id. at 1344. The
10th Circuit disagreed “with the Second Circuit’s decision to uphold the
broad filing restriction limiting access to any federal district court in the
country. . . .” Id. The court held that “it is not appropriate to extend those
restriction to include federal district courts outside of [appellant’s]
Circuit.” Id. The court noted that “it is not reasonable for a court in this
Circuit to speak on behalf of courts in other circuits in the country.” Id.
Zoning – Sexually Oriented Businesses: Doctor John’s, Inc. v.
City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit addressed the constitutionality of “an ordinance
subjecting ‘sexually oriented businesses’ to certain regulations.” Id. at
1153. The 5th Circuit held that “an ordinance which regulated both onsite and off-site adult businesses was not narrowly tailored because the
City failed, as a threshold matter, to provide evidence that off-site
businesses caused negative secondary effects.” Id. at 1166. However, the
10th Circuit explicitly “rejected the on-site/off-site distinction as a basis
for striking down an adult business ordinance as an unconstitutional
time/place/manner restriction.” Id. at 1167. The 10th Circuit disagreed
with its sister circuit and, instead, held that “the mere fact that the
ordinance reaches off-site as well as on-site businesses is insufficient for
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us to declare the ordinance unconstitutional.” Id. The court concluded
that the appellant’s argument “concerning on-site and off-site businesses
fail[ed] to ‘cast direct doubt’ on the City’s rationale.” Id. at 1168.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Service of Process – Rule 4(m) Extension: United States v.
McLaughlin, 470 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2006)
The 7th Circuit decided the effect of Rule 6(b)(2) on Rule 4(m)
regarding service of process on a defendant where the 120-day notice
requirement had lapsed and the plaintiff then sought an extension. Id. at
700. The court offered that “some courts,” including the 5th and 6th
Circuits, automatically apply the “excusable neglect” standard from Rule
6(b)(2) to all Rule 4(m) requests for an extension where the motion is
made after the lapse. Id. The court explained that this would mean that a
plaintiff who missed the original deadline and failed to file an extension
before the expiration of that 120-day period would need to show
excusable neglect in order to have the motion granted. Id. The 7th
Circuit, however, read Rule 6(b)(2) to only be implicated after a district
court had applied Rule 4(m), specifying a new period of time. Id. The
court further held that once the plaintiff did not meet the new deadline,
and subsequently filed a motion to extend that time period, only then
would Rule 6(b)(2) “come into play.” Id.

IMMIGRATION

Jurisdictional Limitations – Streamline Review Process: Gutnik
v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 683 (7th Cir. 2006)
The 7th Circuit reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to review a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision to commit an appeal to
streamlined procedures. Id. at 690. The defendant argued that his case
was improperly subjected to the streamline review process because there
is no prior BIA or federal court precedent on point for the legal issue
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raised by his case. Id. The court noted that “as a result, his case falls
within one of the exceptions set forth in the streamlining regulations at 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(6) such that his appeal of the IJ’s decision should
have been reviewed by a three-member BIA panel.” Id. Circuits have
split on the jurisdictional question, with the 2nd, 8th, and 10th Circuits
finding no jurisdiction and the 1st, 3rd, and 9th Circuits finding for a
remand to a three member BIA panel review. Id. at 691. The court joined
with the 2nd, 8th, and 10th Circuits in finding no jurisdiction on the
grounds that finding otherwise would only exacerbate an already
overburdened case load. Id. at 692.

LABOR LAW

Collective Bargaining Agreements – Scope of Arbitration
Clauses: United Steelworkers of America v. Cooper Tire & Rubber
Co., 474 F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2007)
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of “whether a dispute over a
side agreement that does not provide for arbitration falls within the
CBA’s [collective bargaining agreement’s] arbitration clause . . . .” Id. at
278. The court noted that the 2nd, 4th, and 8th Circuits apply the
collateral test, which requires that “courts consider the similarity of the
side agreement’s subject matter to the subject matter of the CBA,” and
“[i]f the subject matter is dissimilar, the side agreement is deemed
collateral to the CBA.” Id. Under the collateral test, “where the side
agreement is ‘integral’ to the CBA, courts permit arbitration of disputes
over its provisions.” Id. In contrast, the court noted that the 3rd, 7th, and
9th Circuits apply the scope test, which requires that “unless the parties
indicate otherwise, disputes over a side agreement are arbitrable if the
subject matter of the side agreement is within the scope of the CBA’s
arbitration clause.” Id. at 278-79. The 6th Circuit adopted the 9th
Circuit’s interpretation of the scope test. Id. The court held that “[i]n
determining the arbitrability of side letters and side agreements, we begin
our inquiry by analyzing the CBA’s arbitration clause.” Id. at 279. The
court went on to explain that “[w]ith the scope of the arbitration clause in
mind, we then look to the subject matter of the side agreement to
determine if it falls within the clause’s intended coverage.” Id.
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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 – Benefits
Formula: A. T. Massey Coal Co. v. Barnhart, 472 F.3d 148 (4th
Cir. 2006)
The 4th Circuit considered the merits of a suit brought by several
hundred members or affiliates of the coal industry to determine the
meaning of the word “reimbursements” as used in a premiums formula
under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (“the Coal
Act”). Id. at 154. The court explained that the premiums formula dictates
the premiums that coal operators are to pay into the common fund for
each beneficiary on the basis of, inter alia, payments made to
beneficiaries in a base year, minus “‘reimbursements’ received from
Medicare and other publicly financed programs for the base year . . . .”
Id. at 153. The court then explained that the issue is whether
“‘reimbursements’ . . . includes the total payments that Medicare made
. . . ($182.3 million) or only the amount that the [fund] actually paid out
in Medicare benefits to beneficiaries . . . ($156.3 million).” Id. at 154.
The court discussed how negotiations prior to the passage of the Coal
Act between Medicare and the Plans to simplify the reasonable cost
methodology resulted in the adoption of a capitated method. Id. at 15557. With this background, the court stated that “‘reimbursements’ . . . has
a statutory context and historical context, and both reveal a uniform and
precise meaning of the term . . . history shows that the method of
reimbursement adopted from the reimbursements made [under the
capitation method] was a purposeful act, . . . which Congress
incorporated by reference in the Coal Act.” Id. at 160, 162. From this, the
court concluded that “‘reimbursements’ is an unambiguous historical
term of art used by Congress to refer to the total reimbursements that
Medicare actually made, using a capitation method.” Id. at 154. The
court thus sided with the 11th Circuit in a split between that circuit and
the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 154 n.2.
Medicare – Immunity Provision: United States ex rel. Sikkenga
v. Regence BlueCross BlueShield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702 (10th Cir.
2006)
The 10th Circuit faced, in part, a question of statutory
interpretation. Id. at 710. Appellant had alleged that the Medicare carrier
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for the State of Utah “presented false Medicare claims to the
Government” and “submitted a false budget payment request to . . . the
agency that manages Medicare.” Id. at 705. Under the Medicare statutory
scheme pursuant to 42. U.S.C. § 1395(u)(e), Congress granted immunity
to a Medicare contractor’s payment of a claim. Id. at 709. The 11th
Circuit had previously interpreted this immunity provision to have
“unambiguously provided absolute immunity to Medicare” contractors.
Id. The 10th Circuit disagreed with its sister circuit’s interpretation. Id. at
710. In contrast, the court construed the immunity provision to not
provide absolute immunity, but rather that “the immunity excludes cases
involving fraud and gross negligence.” Id. at 711. The 10th Circuit found
support for this interpretation within the legislative history. Id. Although
the district court had relied on the 11th Circuit’s interpretation, the 10th
Circuit affirmed this portion of the district court’s decision based on
other specific procedural issues. Id. at 712.
Longshore Act – Requirements to Obtain Attorney’s Fees:
Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. Dir., 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir.
2007)
The 6th Circuit held that 33 U.S.C. § 928(b) requires a written
recommendation by the district director in order for the plaintiff to
recover attorney’s fees pursuant to a claim under the Longshore Act. Id.
at 265. The 6th Circuit explained that the 9th Circuit “has routinely held
employers liable for attorney’s fees under subsection (b) even when the
literal terms of the statute [have] not been met.” Id. The court also
explained that both the 4th and 5th Circuits “required that each of the
requirements set forth in subsection (b) be met before an employer incurs
liability for attorney’s fees.” Id. The 6th Circuit agreed with both the 4th
and 5th Circuits, emphasizing that these circuits had relied on the
statutory construction in coming to this conclusion. Id. at 266. The court
found “little, if any, support for the Ninth Circuit’s position, even in the
legislative history,” which the 9th Circuit had so heavily relied on in its
decision. Id. at 267. The 6th Circuit concluded that all of the
requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 928(b) must be met before an employer will
incur liability for attorney’s fees under the Longshore Act.
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Tax – Deduction of Investment-Advice Fees for Trusts: William
L. Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.
2006)
The 2nd Circuit addressed the issue of “whether investment-advice
fees incurred by a trust are fully deductible in calculating adjusted gross
income for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) under 26
U.S.C. § 67(e)(1)(2000), or whether these fees are deductible only to the
extent that they exceed two percent of the trust’s adjusted gross income
under § 67(a).” Id. at 150-51. The court explained that under § 67(e)(1),
“[a] trust’s costs are fully deductible, rather than subject to the twopercent floor, if they satisfy both of the following two requirements: (1)
they are ‘paid or incurred in connection with the administration of the . . .
trust’; and (2) they ‘would not have been incurred if the property were
not held in such trust.’” Id. at 153. The court observed that the 6th
Circuit disagreed with the Federal Circuit and the 4th Circuit on whether
investment-advice fees meet § 67(e)(1)’s second requirement. Id. at 15354. The court elected to join the Federal Circuit and the 4th Circuit, and
held that investment-advice fees fail the second requirement. Id. at 156.
The court stated that its “conclusion follows from the fact that individual
property owners obviously can incur investment-advice fees and from
the regulation explicitly including investment-advice fees among an
individual’s miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to § 67(a)’s twopercent floor.” Id. at 160.
Employment – Title VII Claim Preclusion: Nestor v. Pratt &
Whitney, 466 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2006)
The 2nd Circuit decided the issue of “whether a Title VII plaintiff
who prevailed on her discrimination claims before a state administrative
agency and in appeals of the agency decision to state court can
subsequently file suit in federal court seeking relief that was unavailable
in the state proceedings.” Id. at 69. The court observed that this issue
created a split between the 7th and 8th Circuits, which held that such
federal claims were not precluded, and the 4th Circuit, which held that
such federal claims are precluded. Id. The court ruled that its “usual
approach to preemption is . . . seemingly inapplicable” in the Title VII
context because “Title VII permits a claimant to seek—in federal court—
’supplemental’ relief that was unavailable in the state court.” Id. at 7172. The court joined the 7th and 8th Circuits in holding that Title VII
claims filed in federal court seeking supplemental remedies unavailable
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in state court were not precluded by the prior litigation of such claims in
state court. Id. at 72.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act – Time Barred?: Margolies v. Deason, 464
F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 2006)
The 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 8th Circuits have considered the issue of
whether causes of action arising prior to the passage of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 are time barred. Id. at 551. These circuits agree that
the Act did not revive previously extinguished causes of action. Id. The
11th Circuit disagreed with the other circuits in Tello v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2005) finding that statutes that
are unambiguous on retroactivity should be retroactively applied. Id.
Here, the 5th Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits in holding that
the Act did not apply retroactively to revive the pre-Act causes of action.
Id.
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 –
State Valuation Methodology: CSX Transp., Inc. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 472 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2006)
The 11th Circuit held that “railroads may not challenge state
[property tax] valuation methodologies under subsection (b)(1) [of the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R Act)].”
Id. at 1289. The court adopted the 4th Circuit’s view on this issue, which
is in direct conflict with the views of the 2nd and 9th Circuits. Id. at
1287-88. The 11th Circuit explained that “[i]t is a well-settled principle
of statutory interpretation that a statute will not be construed to burden
states in the exercise of their traditional powers unless it clearly states its
intent to do so.” Id. at 1288. Additionally, the court was influenced by
Supreme Court precedent that “has ‘long recognized that principles of
federalism and comity generally counsel that courts should adopt a
hands-off approach with respect to state tax administration.’” Id. at 128889.
ERISA – Delegating Fiduciary Authority: Geddes v. United
Staffing Alliance Employee Med. Plan., 469 F.3d 919 (10th Cir.
2006)
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In choosing to apply deferential review to benefits claims under an
arbitrary and capricious standard, the 10th Circuit rejected the logic
embraced by the 11th Circuit. Id. at 926-27. Instead of reserving
deferential review for cases in which an ERISA plan administrator
delegates its authority to other explicit fiduciaries, the court explained
that the plain language of ERISA and trust law empowered named
fiduciaries to delegate their authority to independent, non-fiduciary third
parties. Id. at 927. The court then reasoned that those third parties acted
as agents of the fiduciary, and consequently held that a plan
administrator allotted discretionary authority through a benefits plan was
entitled to judicial deference for any decisions made by a third party. Id.
RICO – Personal Jurisdiction: Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg., Inc., 468
F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit joined the 2nd, 7th, and 9th Circuits in holding
that section 1965(b) of the RICO statute, “when raised in the proper
venue, extends personal jurisdiction into ‘any judicial district of the
United States’ if necessary to satisfy ‘the ends of justice.’” Id. at 1229. In
contrast with the 4th and 11th Circuits, the court considered section
1965(d) of the statute only for guidance on personal jurisdiction
regarding service of process that was not a summons or a government
subpoena. Id. at 1230. The court relied on other circuits’ readings of the
statute in conjunction with the legislative history and the body of
antitrust legislation to conclude that section (b) was the proper provision
for nationwide service of process on parties outside of the district using
personal jurisdiction based on the “ends of justice” test. Id. at 1231.
§ 11 and § 12(a)(2) Securities Claims – Pleading with
Particularity: Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm. Corp., 464 F.3d
1273 (11th Cir. 2006)
The 11th Circuit referred to §§ 11 and 12(a)(2) securities as
“nonfraud claims” and considered “whether there are circumstances
when FED. R. CIV. PROC. 9(b) would require nonfraud securities claims
to be pled with particularity.” Id. at 1277. The court found that “[t]he
purpose of the rule is to protect a defendant’s good will and reputation
when that defendant’s conduct is alleged to be fraudulent.” Id. at 1278.
Therefore, the court decided that Rule 9(b) does apply in “nonfraud”
claims and that such claims must be pled with particularity, agreeing
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with the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits, but opposing the 8th Circuit. Id.
at 1277.
Medicaid Act – Meaning of the Term “Assistance”: Mandy R. v.
Owens, 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit agreed with the 6th and 7th Circuits’ definition of
the phrase “medical assistance” in 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) of the Medicaid
Act. Id. at 1143. The court found that “the statutory reference to
‘assistance’ appears to have reference to financial assistance rather than
to actual medical services.” Id. The 10th Circuit reasoned that the
Medicaid statute does not require states to be service-providers of last
resort.” Id. at 1146. Noting that the existence of a circuit “split is not
entirely clear,” the 10th Circuit suggested that a circuit split may exist as
to “whether ‘medical assistance’ requires a state to provide actual
services.” Id. at 1143 n.2. This ruling is in dispute with the
determinations of the 1st and 11th Circuits. Id.
Administrative Expense Priority – Collective Bargaining
Agreements: Peters v. Pikes Peak Musicians Ass’n, 462 F.3d 1265
(10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit joined the majority of circuits in “limit[ing] the
administrative expense priority provided in [11 U.S.C.] § 507 to claims
that meet the textual requirements of [11 U.S.C.] § 503, even in cases
that arise under collective bargaining agreements that implicate [11
U.S.C.] § 1113.” Id. at 1269-70. The 6th Circuit and several district
courts follow the minority approach which hold that “the remedial
purpose of § 1113 trumped the literal language of § 503, thus entitling
parties to administrative expense priority under § 507 for claims filed
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, even where the
requirements of § 503 had not been satisfied.” Id. at 1269. In adopting
the majority approach, the 10th Circuit quoted the 3rd Circuit’s
reasoning, that “if Congress had wished to create an automatic priority
for collective bargaining agreement claims, it would have been similarly
explicit in [§] 1113. Conversely, its failure to do so should counsel
against a court’s attempts to read such requirements into the statute.” Id.
at 1270.
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CRIMINAL MATTERS
SENTENCING

Appeals – Finality of Judgment: Burrell v. United States, 467
F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2006)
The 2nd Circuit addressed the issue of “whether a criminal
judgment is final when we have affirmed a defendant’s conviction and
sentence on at least one count, but remanded for the district court to
dismiss the defendant’s conviction and sentence on another count.” Id. at
163. The court noted that a split on this issue exists between the 4th
Circuit, which held that “finality is not delayed if an appellate court
disposes of all counts in a judgment of conviction but remands for a
ministerial purpose that could not result in a valid second appeal[,]”
United States v. Dodson, 291 F.3d 268, 275 (4th Cir. 2002), and the 9th
Circuit, which held that “a judgment is not final if the appellate court
reverses any portion of the district court’s judgment and remands to the
district court, even if the remand is only ministerial. . . .” Id. at 168. The
court sided with the 4th Circuit, and held that “a remand for ministerial
purposes, such as the correction of language in a judgment or the entry of
a judgment in accordance with a mandate, does not delay a judgment’s
finality.” Id. at 166.
Post-Booker – Sentencing Ration Guidelines: United States v.
Castillo, 460 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2006)
The 2nd Circuit decided whether the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) meant that district courts
were free to calculate sentences for drug crimes using a ratio other than
the 100:1 ratio provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). Id. at 353. The court
noted that the 7th and 8th Circuits have held that district courts have
discretion to deviate from the guideline ratio, provided they do not
exceed it. Id. On the other hand, the 1st, 4th, and 11th Circuits have
decided that district courts must conform to the 100:1 ratio guideline. Id.
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The circuit court stressed the differences between § 3553(a)(2), which
lays out policy factors to consider in sentencing, and § 3553(a)(4), which
establishes the sentence categories and their respective ranges. Id. at 355.
Looking at the language of the statute, the legislative history of the
statute, and the history of the guidelines, the 2nd Circuit concluded that,
while a district court has discretion to consider the policy factors laid out
in § 3553(a)(2), it cannot create its own ratio, but must sentence within
the established ratio of the guidelines promulgated in § 3553(a)(4),
despite any disparity in sentencing this approach may create. Id. at 361.
Guidelines – Calculating the Sentencing Range: United States v.
Jackson, 467 F.3d 834 (3d Cir. 2006)
In this case, the 3rd Circuit determined that “district courts must
still calculate what the proper Guidelines sentencing range is,” and as
such, the court stressed “that the entirety of the Guidelines calculation be
done correctly, including rulings on Guidelines departures.” Id. at 83839. The court noted its departure from the 7th and 9th Circuits, “which
have ruled Guidelines departures obsolete in the wake of Booker.” Id. at
839. Moreover, the court noted that “[a]t least six other circuits
essentially employ the same approach to departures . . . and one other has
fashioned a modified (but continuing) role for Guidelines departures.” Id.
The court stated that its determination was “not for jurisdictional reasons,
but rather because the . . . Guidelines still play in integral role in criminal
sentencing.” Id. at 838.
Armed Career Criminal Act – Taylor and Meaning of
“Unlawful or Unprivileged” Entry for Generic Burglary:
United States v. Bennett, 469 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2006)
The 1st Circuit recognized the split that exists between circuits over
the “unlawful or unprivileged” element of generic burglary defined by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Taylor, for purposes of sentencing
enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Id. at 50. The court
indicated that the 4th Circuit, in United States v. Bowden, held that one
who “enters without breaking with intent to commit a felony or larceny is
neither lawful nor privileged” and thus falls under Taylor. Id. The 6th
Circuit, however, in United States v. Maness, stated that the statute
addressed in Bowden does not meet the definition of “generic burglary”
set forth in Taylor, because “intent to commit a crime is a ‘separate and
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distinct element[]’ from unlawful or unprivileged entry.” Id. Because this
issue was not raised below, the 1st Circuit reviewed only for clear error.
Id. at 50-51.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Post-Conviction – Access to Physical Evidence: Savory v. Lyons,
469 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2006)
The 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th and 11th circuits have considered whether a
claim for post-conviction access to physical evidence is cognizable under
§ 1983. Id. at 671. The 11th Circuit, having expressly disagreed with the
4th Circuit approach in Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002),
found that access to the evidence is proper. Id. The court in that case
reasoned that testing of evidence for DNA can be either exculpatory or
inculpatory and is not a direct or indirect attack on the conviction or
sentence. Id. The 9th Circuit has also joined the 11th Circuit’s approach
in Bradley. Id. The 4th and 5th Circuits were concerned that the
defendant would use his claim to access evidence in preparation for a
future challenge to his incarceration. Id. In an unpublished opinion the
6th Circuit espoused this view as well. Id. Here, the 7th Circuit joined the
9th and 11th in its interpretation. Id. at 672. It found that granting the
defendant access to the evidence “would not imply the invalidity of his
conviction.” Id. Nor would it “demonstrate the invalidity of any
outstanding criminal judgment against him and will not unduly intrude
upon the territory of core habeas corpus relief.” Id.
Due Process – An Inmate’s Liberty Interest During Segregation
in Prison: Jordan v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 191 Fed. App’x 639
(10th Cir. 2006)
The 10th Circuit contemplated two splits at issue among the circuit
courts and held that an inmate’s five-year administrative detention did
not create a constitutionally-recognizable liberty interest subject to
procedural due process protections. Id. at 650-51. The court noted that
the Supreme Court had not decided whether an examination of the
conditions, durations, or restrictions of prison confinement should utilize
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a baseline comparison between inmates in the same segregation, or those
from the general prison population. Id. at 652. The circumstances of the
case led the court to find that the conditions of segregation were
“comparable to those of general population inmates” and rejected the
appellant’s argument that his restrictions of confinement presented an
“atypical and significant hardship.” Id. The court agreed with the 6th
Circuit that segregation was not atypical for an inmate whose
participation in violent conduct while in prison was being investigated.
Id. at 653. Further, the court agreed that it was reasonable for prison
officials to adjust conditions of imprisonment while the investigation was
pending. Id. Stating that a “majority of other circuits have also held no
liberty interest arose in administrative detentions presented on appeal,
while a few others have rendered contrary decisions,” the 10th Circuit
denied the appellant’s argument that the segregation violated a liberty
interest, reasoning that due process rights of prisoners were subject to
reasonable limitation given the institution’s legitimate security concerns.
Id.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Court Rules – Imposing an Upward Variance: United States v.
Cousins, 469 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2006)
In this case, the 6th Circuit held that FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 32(h),
which requires that courts give notice of “its intention to impose an
upwards variance,” applies to all sentences that deviate from the
sentencing guidelines. Id. at 574, 580. The 3rd, 7th, 8th, and 11th
Circuits have all held that Rule 32(h) does not apply to sentences which
vary, rather than deviate, from the guidelines. Id. at 580. The 4th, 9th,
and 10th Circuits have held that Rule 32(h) applies to all non-guidelines
sentences. Id. The 6th Circuit agreed with the reasoning of the 4th, 9th,
and 10th Circuits. Id. The court explained that the departure criteria of
“Chapter 5 of the Guidelines, like § 3553(a), specifically identifies
various factors that a court should take into consideration when deciding
whether or not to grant a departure.” Id. The 6th Circuit could not
“discern any distinction between the [Chapter 5] departure criteria and
the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. Accordingly, the court held that Rule 32(h)
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applies to all variances from the sentencing guidelines under Chapter 5
and § 3553(a). Id.

